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NOTE: Most essays on this site represent original theoretical work. If you find these articles interesting, inspiring or helpful, please let me know. If you refer to them, please give me and this website credit. In addition, links back to this page in blogs or from other sites are always appreciated!
NOTE: Most essays on this site represent original theoretical work. If you find these articles interesting, inspiring or helpful, please let me know. If you refer to them, please give me and this website credit. In addition, links back to this page in blogs or from other sites are always appreciated!
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Internet Philosopher - Ask Me A Philosophy Question
Latest Question - Aug 12th, 2008
Would you agree with those such as Alister McGrath that Christianity is rationally defensible, or would you say that the rational aspect is unimportant? If the latter, how would you respond to charges of thoughtless fanaticism in your religiosity?- Alex
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X says that a certain metaphysical view is correct. X says that if this view M is c... - Sam
P
therefore P
For every case in which the premises are true, the concl... - Sam
Answered Questions
Question #1: Can you give me the questions that philosophers ask?Asked by: Malcolm, Oxford, Mar 22nd, 2007
Answer:
That's actually a very interesting question. It's what might be called a "Meta"-question, a question about the questioning process. There are actually logic problems where the correct way to proceed is to ask a meta-question.
For instance...
Suppose you are faced with two brothers, one of whom always lies, and one of whom always tells the truth. Further suppose you have only one allowed question, you can only ask one brother, and you don't know which is which. What is the proper question to ask in order to get a sure answer as to which door leads to a treasure, and which leads to doom?
Answer that meta-question properly, and you'll get the treasure.
The right answer is to pick either brother and ask "If I asked your brother, which door would he tell me to open?" (another meta-question)
Whatever answer you get, do the opposite. The reason is that you're effectively routing the question through both brothers this way, which ensures you'll get one truth and one lie, leaving you with a dependably wrong answer.
Unfortunately, in regards to your query, the question is more interesting than the answer. The current trend in philosophy is to ask a very narrow question, generally about some fine shade of meaning, and to explore the answer at great length. In particular, people have a tendency to seize upon some small weakness of a previous philosopher, and exploit it for the purposes of academic publishing.
However, if you want the questions historically considered by philosophers, or conversely, had you asked, what questions do I think philosophers should ask, the answers would be:
What is the meaning of life? What is the nature of existence? What does it mean to be a good person? What is truth? What is beauty? Toward what end does the universe strive?
For a shot at answering some of these, try this link.
Question #2: whats wrong with you when you hate everyone?
Asked by: adriauna, knoxville tennessee, Oct 29th, 2007
Answer:
Thanks for your question. I should state right at the beginning that this is not only a philosophy question, it is also a mental health question. I am not trained in mental health, so my comments should not take the place of advice from a mental health professional. That having been said:
Hating everyone generally means you are not happy with some aspect of yourself, and/or there is something negative in your life or world that you feel powerless to change. This is a common feeling among teenagers (as shown in the book The Catcher in the Rye), but it can also affect people of other ages, particularly during times of transition. It is often accompanied or replaced by a sense of being unreal, or that everything around you is fake. (If you identify with the main character from the movie "The Truman Show" then you know what this feeling is like).
From an existential point of view there are two main ways to attack this problem:
- You can try to figure out what it is in your own life or self-image that is bothering you and either come to terms with it or figure out a way to change it. Remember, it is not possible to change everyone else, but it is always possible to change yourself. (You might read Dark Side of the Light Chasers by Debbie Ford for help with this process.)
- You can pick one or more people and try to behave in a loving way towards them, even if you hate them. Emotions often follow actions, so if you behave as if you like someone for long enough, it may become true. (If you are a Christian, or own a Bible, see Matthew 5:44.)
Travel to new and different places or taking up new activities can also be helpful in this situation. It doesn't solve anything, but it can help you identify what problems you are carrying with you as opposed to what problems are caused by the people around you.
It should be noted that hating everyone can also be a sign of depression. You might want to talk to a trusted friend or mentor, a religious adviser or a mental health professional.
Question #3: What does R.M. Hare mean by ought?
Asked by: Sam, Nov 20th, 2007
Answer:
Thanks for your question, Sam. In general, the philosophical distinction between "is" and "ought" is between statements of plain fact, such as "the apple is red", and statements that endorse a course of action, such as "you should eat that apple". For R.M. Hare, moral statements --the ones that that belong in the "ought" category --needed to be accompanied by action. In other words if I say "I ought to give money to the poor" then that statement should be accompanied by my actually giving money to the poor.
Hare's "oughts" are closely related to Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative", which is the idea that a moral rule is a rule that I believe should be true universally, a rule that would make the world a better place if everyone followed it (including myself).
I hope this helps. I am far from being an expert on Hare, but there is a good article on him on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._M._Hare.
Question #4: Three human acts/choices that are illegal but not immoral
Asked by: Anonymous, Dec 4th, 2007
Answer:
Thanks for your question.
The tricky part about answering this question is that we generally consider there to be a certain morality that automatically attaches to following the law. In general, the argument is that the rule of law is a necessary (or at the least, a beneficial) thing for humanity as a whole, given that we are social creatures and must live with each other. Thus, breaking a law, no matter what it is, carries some sense of immorality, since it weakens that structure we all live within. To be technical, therefore, we should require that our illegal acts be not merely morally neutral, but that they should have enough moral value to outweigh the moral costs of illegality.
The first, and most important answer is civil disobedience --the breaking of a law that is itself immoral and unjust. Paradigmatic examples from the recent past include violations of the laws of segregation in the American South or the laws of apartheid in South Africa. Illegal strikes and protests can also come under this categorization, when they stand in opposition to practices that are cruelly exploitative or harmful.
If we set aside the objection that breaking the law is immoral in itself, there are many practices which are illegal, but are arguably not immoral in of themselves. For example, to drink (any) alcohol at age eighteen is illegal in the United States, yet (unless you believe alcohol drinking to be intrinsically immoral) it is not immoral outside of its illegality. The putative justification for the law is that eighteen-year-olds are not mature enough to drink safely and responsibly --if eighteen-year-olds drank exclusively in moderation, the law would lose its moral justification.
A final category of illegal-but-not-immoral actions is the breaking of laws which are themselves ridiculous or meaningless. For example, the internet tells me that Idaho state law makes it illegal for a man to give his sweetheart a box of candy weighing less than fifty pounds. Laws of this nature are generally ignored by common consent. The argument here is that actually following such laws would be of greater damage to the rule of law than to break them.
Question #5: Is there a Philosopher that states about making the world a better place?
Asked by: Rosie, Maryland, http://www.myspace.com/shygirl2738, Dec 9th, 2007
Answer:
Thanks for your question. In many ways, you could say that "making the world a better place" was the explicit or implied aim of a large majority of philosophers throughout history; from Plato to Confucius to Marx to Singer. The big disagreements, of course, come from different ideas of what a "better world" would look like, and how we could get there.
For Plato, the better world is the one that is more in line with the "Ideal of Perfect Goodness", and where people make rational decisions in accordance with timeless ideals. For Confucius, a better world is one where people act virtuously, according to the traditions of their ancestors. For Marx, the better world is the result of the revolution of the proletariat, while (Peter) Singer believes that we should act in ways that maximize the happiness of all life forms, including humans and animals alike.
From my point of view, the key problem we need to solve as human beings is the tension between living as fully realized individuals, and living in ways that will support best interests of humanity as a whole. If we can solve that problem, I believe we will also be able to resolve problems such as the self-destructive practice of war and the ongoing destruction of our natural environment, both of which are aggravated by our consumerist culture. For more on my views, please follow this link: http://kitoba.com/pedia/Social+Change.html
Question #6: how should you behave on the internet
Asked by: john, san diego, Dec 19th, 2007
Answer:
This is as much a practical question as a philosophical one, and from that perspective, I would say this: Remember that nearly everything you post on the internet is archived and searchable, including email, so try not to put anything out there that you wouldn't want people to be able to connect to you ten years from now. I think we all forget that rule from time to time, but we do so at our own risk.
Other than that I think people should try to conduct themselves on the internet with some version of the same standards they would apply in person. The internet is an opportunity to create a new persona, but you should try to make it a better persona, not a worse one. Be kind and helpful to those you encounter, even the "newbies," treat others with graciousness and politeness, strive to accomplish good things and avoid negative ones. No one meets those standards all the time, of course, but that's an ideal to strive for. When you look back at your old posts a year from now, you'll be happier to see a compilation of witty and appropriate comments than a record of flame wars, random trolling, and pictures of your butt.
Question #7: Hi. If something is objectively true, does it have to fall within the realm of science, and does the fact that something does not fall within the realm of science prove its relativism? (Examples - art and ethics)
Asked by: Sam, Jan 8th, 2008
Answer:
This is a great question. Unfortunately, the answer is surprisingly controversial and complex:
The first challenge is figuring out what "objectively true" means. Most --but not all!-- people believe there is a universe "out there" that has characteristics which are independent of any particular person's observations or perceptions. This is a position generally known in philosophy as "Realism."
To find out if you are a "Realist", try this thought experiment: Imagine you personally do not exist, and furthermore that other people don't exist, and in fact, that there is no intelligent life in the universe. Do things such as stars and planets still exist? Does a proton still have the same mass? Does water on earth still freeze at zero degrees Celsius? If you think so, you are a Realist.
The majority of people, even if they aren't sure that the things that exist actually have the forms and the nature that we think they do, believe that something exists objectively --which is to say, independent of any given subject. Unfortunately, this is impossible to "prove", given that each of us is imprisoned, so to speak, inside our own experience. There is no way for me to show incontrovertibly that there is anything independent of my own personal experience.
In addition, Realism by itself doesn't actually tell us as much as you might think --it says something exists beyond our perceptions, but not what that something is. If, however, you believe that the world is more-or-less the way it appears to be, then you are not just a Realist, you are a "Naturalist", or a "Realist about Perceptions". In other words, you think the familiar world of trees, sky, earth, stars, moon, sun, etcetera, exists generally the way it seems to.
This seems like a natural (no pun intended) step, but it runs into some problems. One is that it is vulnerable to the possibility explored in the "Matrix" movies (but originated by Descartes) that your perception of the world and all its objects are generated by causes quite different than the seeming ones --in the case of the Matrix, a computer, in the case of Descartes, an malicious demon. It may seem far-fetched, but it gains plausibility when we think of how easily our perceptions can be shifted --a set of rose-colored glasses makes everything look pink, just as being told that a student is smart can change our perceptions of his or her classwork.
This leads us at long last to the starting point of your question. In general, scientists replace "Naive Naturalism", the thought that the world is just as we perceive it, with "Scientific Naturalism". In scientific naturalism, it is accepted that objects may have a "real existence" very different from our perceptions --for instance, who would guess that fire and water are both made of the exact same building blocks of electrons, protons and neutrons? The claim is made, however, that objective reality relates to our perceptions of it in orderly, rule-governed and consistent ways, and that those relationships can be discovered through the use of the scientific method.
In my opinion, the scientific method is not the only way of discovering truths or "Truths" about the world, but it does have many practical advantages, including the fact that the things it discovers are, by definition, reliable (they will work the same way each time) and fit into a general schema that fits together with all the other scientific truths.
If we take your question at face value, "If something is objectively true, does it have to fall within the realm of science?" the answer is no. Assuming we take a Realist stance, and agree that there ARE things that are objectively true out there, it is clear that some of those true things will be outside the realm of what science can tell us now --whether or not there is intelligent life on other planets, for example --and even that some of it might forever be outside the realm of what science can demonstrate.
I think what you really mean, however, is "does a proposition have to be tested by the scientific method in order to be a valid and reliable piece of knowledge?" That's not a question that itself has an objective or uncontroversial answer. For example, we might say that there could be other methods --substantially different from our current science --that would give reliable answers. Would we consider those methods "scientific" because they were reliable? In that case, all we mean by "scientific" is "reliable". But we can't disprove that other such methods might exist --after all, much of what we consider as good science today would have been alien to scientists of the past.
Another counterclaim is that there are other non-methodical sources of truth. A religious person (such as myself) might be comfortable with the claim that religious revelation provides a source of truths that are equally or exceedingly "objective" as the truths verified by science, while a non-religious person would reject that claim.
As far as the second part of your question, what about things such as art and ethics? Are they intrinsically relativist, which is to say, are they irreducibly dependent on subjective and personal beliefs or characteristics that do not generalize?
On the one hand, we should keep in mind the fact that it might be possible that a "science" of art or ethics could be someday created, which is to say, that we could figure out ways to make statements about those fields that are as testable and reliable as those about fields such as physics and chemistry. In my opinion, however, that would first require not just a different understanding of art and ethics, but also a different understanding of science (See here for my own attempts to theorize about art). Previous attempts to make a science out of such things have generally focused on reducing them to purely material terms, and have not resulted in any notable successes.
This brings up a final issue raised by your question. Do we live in a universe where everything is best explained in purely material terms --i.e. as the extended ramifications of the trajectories of protons, electrons, neutrons and other particles, or even in a universe where everything is capable of being explained in such terms? There are quite a large number of people who would endorse not merely the second statement but also to the first (please notice the differences!). But it should be made clear, such a statement is essentially a declaration of faith. It is not an independently provable proposition, and it is capable of being wrong.
Let me thus rephrase your questions: "Given the current state of human knowledge, is the scientific method the only widely accepted, internally consistent, controllable and reliable way of constructing new knowledge; and do fields such as art and ethics currently fall outside the realm of what science has proven itself to be capable of considering successfully?" The answer to that question is a highly qualified "yes".
Question #8: I believe that epiphenomenalism is true. (Mental causation is unscientific). I also believe that if it is true, then there is no basis for morality. (You cannot blame physical causes... ) How should I explore this and similar questions - not compromising NEITHER intellectual honesty nor sanity?
Asked by: Sam, Jan 9th, 2008
Answer:
Let’s clarify our terms here. Epiphenomenalism is the belief that mental experiences of choice and freely willed action are basically illusions. They are the accidental side effects of purely physical events and cannot be the source of any action or event. In other words, I may believe that I am choosing to type these words now appearing on the screen, but in fact, the words are being created by a complex set of physical/chemical reactions --I merely think that I have the freedom to type whatever I wish.
It would be a mistake to call this view scientific in the first place; since it rejects, without adequate explanation, a large pool of data --that being your own subjective experience of mental agency. It may be true that you cannot prove that the people you see around you are not cleverly designed automata that merely appear to have internal mental states. I feel safe in assuming, however, that you do experience yourself as possessing both consciousness and will. Before rejecting that experience, you would need a theory that adequately explains why certain configurations of atoms (people) appear to behave as though they have mental states, and furthermore why you personally experience some phenomena, such as the movement of your arms and legs as under your control, and others, such as the weather or the movements of other human beings, as impervious to your will (in other words: if your sense of agency is an illusion, and you are merely an observer of all things, then why does that feeling of control or perception of agency extend only to some of the many things you observe?).
Epiphenomenalism provides no such explanation, rather, it amounts to a blanket statement of belief (or rather, disbelief) on the subject of mental agency. In fact, the situation is even worse, since if epiphenomenalism were true, it could not be proved in any meaningful sense, give that the demonstration of proof would be (in that case) as empty as any other mental illusion.
Given this, one practical solution to your dilemma would be to adopt a version of Pascal’s wager, as follows: If, on the one hand, epiphenomenalism is true, then your beliefs and actions will be determined by events beyond your control. In that situation, your decision to believe in epiphenomenalism and behave accordingly will be equally as meaningless and predetermined as your decision to reject epiphenomenalism. On the other hand, if epiphenomenalism is untrue, or simply flawed in ways we do not currently understand, then your decisions and actions do have validity, and potentially make a significant difference in the world. Therefore, you are justified in acting and behaving as though epiphenomenalism is false --if you can! --no matter what the true state of affairs.
Although epiphenomenalism is a relatively new philosophical position, it raises issues similar to those faced by anyone who believes that the universe is deterministic in one way or another, whether that be because the physical trajectories of the subatomic particles are held to be predictable and unalterable, or because the story of life is held to have been prewritten in indelible ink in God’s diary. In each scenario, however, my answer would be the same. Whether or not we live in a way that is fated, the only option that makes sense is to live as though our freedoms of choice were momentous and absolute.
My sense, however, is that your real question is how to reconcile your belief that we live in a fundamentally physical universe with your sense that mental or metaphysical entities such as values and ideals do make a difference, I would suggest that you look into “Emergentism,” the idea that irreducibly complex behaviors can arise from simple foundations --as in the mathematical phenomenon of fractal geometry. From that standpoint, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a mental phenomenon such as consciousness might emerge from a purely physical ground, yet not be reducible to something understandable in a purely physical framework; and even that a higher-order pattern (consciousness) could influence a lower-order pattern (physical matter) through the kinds of complex feedback loops that are ubiquitous in chaotic and emergent systems (rather than through “mysterious energy” or whatever other non-scientific channel of causation you fear embracing mental states would commit you to).
Furthermore, if we take ourselves to be patterns of emergent complexity, there is in fact an underlying foundation for morality that attaches to that conception, to the effect that some choices --the ones that allow us to live in harmony with other complex patterns --are positive in that they increase the amount of complex order in the world, while others --the ones that destroy --are negative.
Question #9: My argumentation for my version of Epiphenomenalism is that if it had been not true, free willed actions would influence the movement of atoms, and the laws of physics & chemistry would not work when it comes to the human body. However, they do work. It does not mean (like some people wrongly think) that the mental states are illusions, but the fact that they are causal is an illusion. I agree that epi...ism has to give an explanation how is consciousness created, and how exactly the illusion of free is caused, why only specific illusions are caused and not others. This things are unknown. However there is no theory that can explain mind-body relationship as far as I know. They all have to explain those things... Epi...ism at least does not contradict science.
Asked by: Sam, , Jan 9th, 2008
Answer:
Hi Sam,
I appreciate your distinction on casual versus total Epiphenomenalism (I've amended my posted answer slightly to reflect that) but I'm not sure it affects my answer, since I was focusing on the causal component anyway.
Your argument contains a fallacy. You are assuming that mental agency, if true, would operate indiscriminately --or at the least, indiscriminately within the confines of the body. In other words, if I concentrate, I should be able to dissolve my hand into its component atoms as easily as I can raise it or lower it, and no one should ever suffer from paralysis, etcetera.
This does not necessarily follow from the idea that mental agency might exist. For example, I can construct a scenario that would account for the given data without leading to that situation.
You are aware, of course, that in general, events on a subatomic level do not create visible effects on the world, because subatomic particles are so tiny an numerous that their effects never aggregate to the point where it becomes a macroscopic causal agent. Even an occurrence as momentous as the decay of a radioactive atom will generally pass unnoticed by the world.
Yet it is possible to create circumstances under which even that single atom's fate can have an outsized impact. For instance, the decay of a single atom in an armed nuclear bomb creates an explosive chain reaction. Similarly, a Geiger counter, which is designed to measure the decay of single atoms, can be attached to an apparatus that responds to the atom's decay in a macroscopic way --by killing a cat, in Schrödinger's famous example, or less violently, by playing a recorded song, or raising a mechanical arm.
I'm sure you anticipate my logic. We would call the decay of the atom the causal agent of the death of the cat or the raising of the arm, but that would not imply that the range of agency of the atom was unlimited. The decay of the atom could only create a tightly defined range of macroscopic effects predetermined by the nature of the apparatus.
In theory, human agency could follow an analogous pattern, with the brain taking the place of the Geiger counter and the body being the apparatus that translates the subatomic event into a macroscopic action. In your version of Epiphenomenalism, you admit mental processes, so let us further theorize that a mental process somehow localized in the brain could create subatomic events of the type the brain was optimized to detect. The end result would be that the mental process would indeed have macroscopic agency, but only though the well-defined channels created by the combined apparatus of the body and the brain.
I'm not claiming that this is in fact the mechanism at work, but it demonstrates the inadvisability of supporting a belief in Epiphenomenalism through the argument you outlined.
Question #10: How in general should I address topics in which the consequences are scary, while maintaining intellectual integrity? ...Aren't philosophers ever in the dilemma of compromising intellectual integrity versus becoming crazy?
Asked by: Sam, , Jan 9th, 2008
Answer:
This is a rare case where I agree with David Hume, one of my least favorite philosophers. As philosophers (or scientists) we are entrusted with the task of theorizing about the world and to trying to understand it to the best of our abilities. But we should never allow the gaps in our theories to destroy the fabric of our everyday lives.
Human comprehension is limited and subject to flaws, and our best and most sure statements about the nature of the world are doubtlessly inadequate approximations. The irreconcilable results that stem from our favored theories, therefore, are more profitably viewed as indications of problems in the theories or in our understandings of those theories, than as indications of flaws in the nature of the universe itself. In my view, intellectual integrity is more honored than endangered by an honest admission of the limitations on intellectual apprehension --with the caveat that we are then honor-bound to keep working to improve our theories to the point where they do work in the world we live in.
Question #11: A circular argument is technically a valid argument.
P
therefore P
For every case in which the premises are true, the conclusion will be true. So what makes it a bad one?
Asked by: Sam, , Feb 2nd, 2008
Answer:
Thanks for your question. Although we tend to focus on validity in logic, it is actually only the minimal baseline requirement for a "good" argument. Valid means that the conclusion is guaranteed to be true if the premises are true. But in order for an argument to be "sound" it needs also to have true premises. Otherwise, it might just be "vacuously valid" as in the case where the premises contradict each other, and thus can never be true simultaneously.
P and not P
Therefore X
is also a "valid" argument, no matter what P and X might be. But it can never be sound.
Your case, however is different. The problem with the circular argument is not that it cannot be sound, but that it does not play the function of an argument --to convince us of things we did not believe before. A circular argument yields exactly and only what you put into it. It does not increase your understanding or store of knowledge. It is "bad" not because it is invalid, but because it is non-functional. If presented in a debate or philosophical paper, it is considered misleading and illegitimate because it claims to prove something that it presents as a given or as an assumption.
Question #12: whats (if anything) is wrong with epiphenolism?
Asked by: Rachel, Feb 7th, 2008
Answer:
I've already answered several questions on this subject, but here's a quick summary of my view: Epiphenomenalism fails to offer an adequate alternate explanation for the phenomenon it disbelieves --i.e. the subjective experience of making choices and having our bodies respond (at least partially) to our will. In particular, it cannot explain why, given the hypothesis that no part of our bodies is actually under the conscious control of the [fictive?] will, do some parts of the body seem to be under our command, while others, like the heart, do not.
Also, how can one explain the existence of physical skills such as wiggling your ears, playing the piano or juggling? These are highly technical skills that seemingly take willpower to gain. It seems difficult to accept that they are talents our bodies (randomly?) acquire independent of any conscious effort.
Question #13: explain how doubt leads descartes to postulate human essence as non material
Asked by: , Feb 14th, 2008
Answer:
I have the unpleasant intuition that someone may be trying to get me to complete their philosophy homework or essay question here. Nonetheless, applying the principle of charity and assuming this query is legitimate, I'll try to give at least a brief answer:
In general, Descartes' project is to doubt everything he possibly can, including whether the world exists as we perceive it, or is simply an illusion or deliberately deceiving simulation (as in the movie "The Matrix"). At the end of his process of extreme doubt, all he can be sure of is his famous dictum: "I think, therefore I am". In other words, he knows he is thinking, because otherwise, he couldn't even be doubting the things he doubts, and since something must exist in order to think, he knows that he must exist in some form, even if that form is not what he thinks it is. In other words, Descartes might be a space alien, or a creature of pure energy, or a disembodied spirit, or a mathematical abstraction, but he must be something, and that something must be able to think, since he can verify the fact of his thinking by immediate experience.
To put a quick gloss on the situation, this convinces Descartes that what he is in his most essential form is a creature that thinks, since all the material facts about himself could be other than they are without changing the central core of his identity as a thought-capable entity.
Hope that helps you with your test-- oops! I mean with your sense of deep philosophical bewilderment. :)
Question #14: "is lucifer interpreted as pining for the god he once loved and has been cast down by" sorry more of a theological question here (agnostic's novel research)
Asked by: Stuart, UK, Feb 19th, 2008
Answer:
Thanks for your question. One important thing to remember here is that with a few brief exceptions, the devil is barely mentioned in the Bible itself --and in fact, the one mention of "Lucifer" by name may not even refer to the devil at all. So from that point of view, there isn't really an "official" answer to your question. The majority of the lore about Lucifer in the Western tradition comes from Dante's Inferno and Milton's Paradise Lost, so if you want to be in tune with the general opinion, those would be the sources to check. Generally the understanding is that Lucifer was the best and brightest of the angels, until he tried to arrogate God's place as ruler of the universe.
None of this answers your question, but given Lucifer's extra-canonical nature, I think you'd be perfectly justified in exploring your own interpretation. You might also find it interesting to note that in the Islamic tradition, the devil is considered a "loyal" but misguided servant of God, whose chief crime is his jealousy and hostility towards mankind, and whose destiny is to be reconciled to God at the end of time.
Question #15: I would take a standard textbook on math, where all the propositions are correct. Write down 99 correct mathematical statements. And then add "Zeus exists", and compile a text.
Then I would argue, that if we have a box, from which we sample randomly 99 balls and they are have the property of being black, we can think with good reason that the next one will be black. And therefore, since 99 of the math propositions in the texts are have the property of being correct, there is good reason to think that "Zeus exists" is also correct. It seems wrong somewhere. But where?
Asked by: Sam, , Feb 21st, 2008
Answer:
No matter how strong an inductive argument is, it cannot guarantee results the same way a deductive argument can. It is always theoretically possible for the premises of an inductive argument to be true and the conclusion to be false. In the case you mention, one might make a strong inductive argument to the effect that since the first 99 statements in the book were true, the last would be as well --but that conclusion might still be false. Furthermore, if you are aware of how the book was constructed and you do not include that information in your argument, you are guilty of the fallacy of suppressed evidence, and the argument can no longer be considered "strong." Clearly, writing a false statement in a book of all true statements does not magically make that last statement true, and your knowledge of that fact must therefore be counted as a factor when judging strength of the argument. That may seem hopelessly subjective, but unlike the mathematically precise and assured conclusions of deductive arguments, the conclusions of inductive arguments can never be divorced from the real-world vagaries of context and circumstance.
Question #16: On one hand, arguments are supposed to be objective - something which is true is always true, for everyone. On the other hand, if person says "P exists because X,Y,Z", while he personally has seen the evidence (x,y,z) for P, and another person says "P exists because X,Y,Z" and he has only read about X,Y,Z from second sources - their knowledge is actually very different. Where is that difference (crucial one) reflected in logic?
Asked by: Sam, , Feb 24th, 2008
Answer:
I think your question is rooted in the fact that we generally consider two distinguishably different subjects under the umbrella of logic. The first is the art of argument as it takes place in natural language. The second is an deliberately constructed system, first proposed by Aristotle, and later greatly extended and expanded by figures such as Boole and Frege, which is intended to capture some of the essential qualities of natural argument, but to do so in a way that has mathematical rigor, precision and surety.
In ordinary language some of the arguments we use are based on matters of fact, the perceived truth of which cannot help but be subjective. Other arguments are largely definitional and thus deductive --they express relations of ideas that follow directly and inevitably from agreed-upon definitions.
In formal logic, the only arguments allowed are of the second type, and they exist within a framework carefully constructed so as to eliminate all remaining ambiguities of context, meaning and truth value. Thus, they can truthfully be described as objective and sure to the same extent and with the same assurance as mathematical truths such as "2+2=4" --at least (and this is an important caveat!) within the agreed-upon framework.
Your example of [(x AND y AND z ) IMPLY p ], however, shows the effects of mixing the two types of argument in ordinary language. Let us assume that there is a valid deductive relationship between x,y and z and p. In that case, given x,y, and z, it would be objectively the case that p would also have to be true. But all arguments are essentially hypothetical statements. The conclusion is only as good as the premises. If we have reason to doubt x,y and z, then we have equal reason to doubt p (assume we have no independent reason to believe p).
In general, deductive arguments are "objective", inductive arguments are "subjective." But one should be aware of an additional opportunity for confusion stemming from the concept of "mathematical induction," which, despite its name, is an objective and sure process for establishing mathematic truths. This concept encompasses all arguments of the form "f(0), f(n) IMPLIES f(n+1), therefore all f". It is so-named because of superficial similarities to ordinary language induction, but it gains a rigor on its way into mathematics that moves it into the realm of surety.
Question #17: what do you know that you do not know
Asked by: Anonymous, Feb 25th, 2008
Answer:
This question can be interpreted in at least two different ways, based on internal ambiguities. From one perspective, we can take it as a inquiry about those things we have knowledge of our own lack of knowledge about. I know that I do not know what day I will die, or what the afterlife might be like. I know that I do not know if there are aliens in outer space. I know that I do not know how to speak the Zulu language.
On the other hand, we can take the "that" as an equals sign, and the question becomes the paradoxical one, what is it that you both know and do not know (simultaneously). It is an easy temptation to dismiss questions like this out of hand, as meaningless nonsense, but as powerful thinkers from Ecclesiastes to Kierkegaard to Nils Bohr and beyond have noted, it is the most paradoxical concepts that tend to lead to the most powerful insights.
Unfortunately, in this case, no powerful insight arises for me --at least not immediately --out of contemplating this question, so for the moment, I will simply leave it with this respectfully inadequate answer.
Question #18: [paraphrased] Inductive arguments establish objective facts, so how can they be considered subjective?
Asked by: Sam, , Mar 19th, 2008
Answer:
Let's accept for the moment the idea that there are objective facts about the world, things that are right or wrong, true or false independent of any observer. If so, those cannot be "established" by arguments. All that can be established by arguments is the grounds for believing that certain claims (statements we hold as true) are factual (objectively true).
An argument is always a conditional. In a deductive argument, the only question is whether or not the premises are true. If they are, then the conclusion must also be. But in an inductive argument, there is an additional amount of indeterminacy added by the inability of the premises to absolutely guarantee the condition.
Where a deductive argument can be absolutely and objectively classified as either valid or invalid, the judgment of whether an inductive argument is strong or weak is a matter of opinion, and thus inherently subjective. The facts themselves are not what is being judged --only the sufficiency of our grounds for believing claims about them.
Question #19: 'actions' speak louder than words, how can i know that the actions are just a 'smoke screen'
Asked by: Jimmy, Mar 22nd, 2008
Answer:
I think the philosophical answer here is that it's our beliefs, commitments and values that lend our actions consistency. If the image we present to the world is at odds with our core commitments, then that mismatch will tend to be betrayed in small ways. There's an old truism that you can tell a lot about a person by the way he or she treats the waiters and waitresses in a restaurant. So my advice would be this. Watch the person carefully, not in terms of how he or she behaves towards you, but towards others. Is he or she kind or rude to service personnel, children, animals, significant others, parents, acquaintances and so forth? How does he or she react under pressure or when uncomfortable? Have you met family members, close friends, employees or so forth, and if so, what did they say about the person?
In addition, pay close attention to what that person says about others. Who does he or she admire, who does he or she despise? Both the traits that the person admires, and (paradoxically) the traits he or she finds particularly bothersome are clues as to the secret personality beneath the façade.
In my opinion how someone treats other people is the most important question, but there are other clues available as well. What does his or her home or workspace look like? How does he or she respond to tasks? To criticism? To praise? To gifts? To disappointments?
In sum, I would say that most people are constantly broadcasting who they really are, even if they have an image that is quite different. The key is to be observant enough to see the real person beneath, and to resist the urge to fool oneself into believing that someone is better --or worse! --than he or she really is.
Question #20: HOW COME PHILOSOPHERS SUCH AS N.FREDERICK DOUBT EVERYTHING
Asked by: GRACE, UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO, http://UL.CA.ZA, Apr 23rd, 2008
Answer:
I'm not familiar with N. Fredrick in particular, but skepticism --doubting things --is one of the four essential services philosophers provide to a society (the other three are mystical guidance, system-building, and practical guidance).
In general a society cannot function smoothly if all things are questioned at all times. If things --social structures, moral values, traditions, customs, and so forth-- are taken for granted, however, then they can become corrupt, stagnant or obsolete. By casting a skeptical eye on things that everyone else takes for granted, a philosopher such as the one you mention clears out a society's accumulated conceptual detritus and paves the way for progress.
Other famous skeptical philosophers include Socrates, the Zen Buddhists, Chang Tzu, Sextus Empiricus and David Hume.
Question #21: how do I make my school safer from a school shooting?
Asked by: , Apr 23rd, 2008
Answer:
This is a heartbreaking question, and I wish I had faster and easier answers, but I don't. In the larger picture this comes down to a question of values. As a society, we need to do a better job of valuing each and all individual human lives for their uniqueness and for their humanity. Although we may pay lip service to the idea that each person is important, our schools often push agendas of conformity. Meanwhile, our society is immersed in the message that violence is the answer to all problems. It is a message repeated over and over in our movies, our video games, our music, our sports, and even in our foreign policies --the way we relate to other nations. We've also created a culture where violence and violent crime are sure tickets to celebrity status.
So, are there any practical solutions? Two of the things I don't think work are punishing people more severely, since most people who commit school shootings are suicidal anyway; or making schools into fortresses since these attacks tend to come from within, not from the outside. I also think trying to run from the problems and the violence of the inner cities doesn't work, since the majority of large-scale school shootings have taken place in the suburbs.
The best thing I can recommend is simply to reach out to people individually or collectively. I don't believe anyone is born to be a school shooter. Each of us has a potential to help people and a potential to harm people, and the side that shows is often determined by what we experience around us. If we help people manifest their better sides, it can help them win the fight against their worst sides.
Personally, I run an arts program for inner city teenagers, and it is my belief that every time a teen comes to participate he or she becomes a little less likely to to become involved in drugs, crime or gangs.
Good luck, I'll be praying for you.
Question #22: I don't know why I'm studing at school. My goal is not clear at all. I have no idea how I can be beneficial for my society. In fact, I wanna know how I can motivate myself to study harder and be happy in my life. (I'm studying in engineering with application in biology)
Asked by: sahar, US, Apr 24th, 2008
Answer:
First, I would like to congratulate you for asking, essentially, "What is the meaning of life?" Far too many people live their entire lives without ever questioning the choices they choose and the decisions they make.
In my view, there are three basic sources of meaning: Personal, social and universal. We'll tackle social first, since it's the most straightforward.
I - SOCIAL:
The way to live a meaningful life in a social context is to help other people, and there are six or seven major avenues I would recommend to pursue this:- The Environment - this may be the most important question for all of us right now. How can we save the environment before it is too late? I would note that engineering might be a good pathway towards this issue --in terms of creating cleaner technologies, or new ways to deal with pollution.
- Peace - We need to stop killing each other. People have been working on this for thousands of years, but that doesn't mean that it's insoluble or that we should give up.
- Health Care - Many people around the world are dying from preventable diseases. If you're interested in medicine, your background in biology could feed into this.
- Poverty and Social Justice - We live in a world where some people are incredibly wealthy and others live in abject misery. No matter where in the world you live, there are simple direct things you can do to help make life better for the poor of your community.
- Music or the Arts - The world can always use somebody who brings a little more beauty into the world.
- Education and Mentoring - Even if you're not enthusiastic about your own education, you might feel better about passing some of it on to a younger generation. When we teach or mentor those younger than ourselves, we shape the future.
II - Personal
For some people, the standard modern human narrative of get educated, get a job, support and raise a family is enough, for others it is not. Particularly in college, many people discover they have lived their entire lives by the decisions of someone else. In my view, we all have limited lifespans and none of us knows he or she will be alive tomorrow, so I think we all have a right to pursue our own destinies --given that we are not harming or exploiting others. No one has the right to force you to live the life they want you to live.That said, simply abandoning the things you are involved in now is not going to make you any happier. You need to figure out what you want first, and pursue it second. I recommend the following: First, buy two small blank journals. For the next several months, make a point of trying to remember all your dreams, and to write them down in one of the books as soon as you wake up. Feel free to add pictures or whatever else will help make the dreams more vivid to you. In the other book, write your best and boldest daydreams about life --and also your biggest and most secret fears. Set aside some time every day to meditate on these two books and they will eventually tell you who you are and what you want.
III - Universal
This is the big hard question --what is the meaning of life in the most universal sense. Why are we here? For me as a Christian, I take my answers largely from my faith. If you come from a religious tradition, you might study the holy books of your own faith for some answers. If not, you might try reading some of the great works of religion and philosophy of the world. Personally, I recommend Plato, the Tao Te Ching, Ecclesiastes and the New Testament from the Bible, Kierkegaard and the writings of the Sufi mystics as good places to start.Good luck to you. You may find that you are a philosopher --one driven by nature to search for meaning.
Question #23: Compare our approach to knowledge about the past with our approach to knowledge about the future.
Asked by: Axel, Brisbane, May 2nd, 2008
Answer:
This sounds like an essay question prompt --which suggests a question of ethics: Should I be doing homework help? Putting that aside, however, I'm not sure how much there is to say about this one. If we try to look at the problem "untainted by philosophy" as my professor used to say, our common sense tells us that our knowledge of the past is more solid than our knowledge of the future. Clearly, the sureness of our knowledge of the past diminishes as events recede into history, or as that knowledge is based on testimony rather than direct experience. It is also true that our memories can be inaccurate. Finally, if we give creedence to some more far-fetched thought experiments, it is possible that we may have all be created, complete with false memories, just in this present moment, so that we have no accurate knowledge of the past.
The future, however, is known to us only by extrapolation, even in the most charitable and naturalistic interpretation of our circumstances. We observe the patterns of the past, and extend them through the present moment into territory that is yet to occur. Yet as philosopher David Hume pointed out, there is no proof that the future will resemble the past, we just take that proposition for granted. There is a truism governing this belief that is trite but inarguable: "Everything stays the same until it changes." The fact that something has happened a hundred times before is no guarantee it will happen again.
Some people think the future is fated or deterministic, and thus potentially knowable. Others think the days ahead are yet to be written, and so theoretically incapable of being known but only of being hypothesized. From either perspective, however, we have no effective way of knowing what will happen tomorrow. All we can do is guess.
Question #24: Is morality objective?
Asked by: Alex , May 15th, 2008
Answer:
This is a terrific question. Historically, the dominant picture of morality was once one of absolutes. Things were considered either right or wrong, generally by divine decree, with little or no ambiguity. The main thing that changed this conception was a growing awareness that different societies --or the same society in different eras-- have had very different moral standards. As an example, I am a Christian, and thus part of a moral tradition that extends back to the ancient Israelites. Yet some of my moral convictions (such as my affirmation of pacifism) are diametrically opposed to some of theirs (i.e. their warlike tendencies).
The recognition that moral judgments change with time and vary from place to place led to moral relativism, the idea that all moral judgments are subjective and contextual. At most, so the reasoning ran, one could be evaluated by his or her own moral standards and convictions. This too, however, seems wrong. Infanticide, cannibalism and slavery have been practiced in many times and places, yet we would hesitate to call them right, even for their own contexts. Similarly there are virtues --generosity, compassion, honor --that seem worthy of universal affirmation.
Observations of this nature led to a third approach to morality, often called the "perennial philosophy", the idea that there are common moral principles affirmed in all great philosophies, regardless of time and place --such as the "Golden Rule" ("do unto others as you would have them do unto you"), variants of which are found worldwide. The problem with this idea, however, is threefold. First, there is no clear and uncontroversial way of establishing what actually belongs in the perennial philosophy; second, there is a danger of ending up with a washed-out "consensus morality" that offers no real guidance beyond base intuitions; and third, it seems to preclude all possibility of moral progress --the concept that our morals can get better with time.
My own opinion on the matter is that there are both objective and subjective aspects to morality. I think, objectively speaking, that each entity (such as a person or an animal) and each collective (such as a society, a culture, a species) has a "responsibility" to express its own unique existence, yet no less of a responsibility to promote the interests of all other denizens of the universe. From this kind of standpoint, we can even evaluate the morality of creatures very different from ourselves --judging (for example) a mitochondrion, which supports the functioning of almost all earthly life, as morally superior to a virus, which promotes its own interests at the expense of its hosts.
From a subjective point of view, however, it is clear that there is an ample amount of ambiguity and context-dependence inherent in evaluating even these simple criteria. What is the proper balance between self and society, between one's own interests and the interests of the universe? And how can one know what serves the interests of the universe in the first place?
It is here, I believe, that religion reenters the picture. Religion --with its connection to the infinite --is what gives us the ability to navigate moral issues with confidence. Yet even faith in an unchanging deity does not mean that human societies, which exist in a changing and evolving world, might not experience changing answers to deep moral questions.
Question #25: Does Existentialism, in general, synthesize well with other philosophies such as Phenomenology?
Asked by: David, May 31st, 2008
Answer:
The term phenomenology means the study of phenomena, where phenomena means observable experience. The chief difference between phenomenology and empiricism (which also studies observable experience) is that phenomenology tends to focus on subjective, first-person experiences of the world, whereas empiricism aspires to create an objective, third-person experience of the world.
The "existence" in Existentialism, on the other hand, comes from the idea that "existence precedes essence," where an object's essence is viewed as a set of indispensable defining characteristics common to all such objects. A chair, essentially speaking, is a four-legged object that people sit upon; a mirror is essentially an object that casts a reflection. The existentialist claim is that human beings have no such essence. We, as human beings, create our own self-definitions through freely willed actions. We cannot be predefined, our essences are not predetermined, but created in each new moment through the acts that compose our existence.
What the two movements have in common is a radical emphasis on the first-person perspective, which helped the Phenomenology of thinkers such as Heidegger and Husserl to become a major influence on the familiar French Existentialism of Sartre and Camus. Rather than saying that the two philosophies synthesize well with each other, therefore, it might be more accurate to say that the most familiar form of existentialism is itself a synthesis of the first-person perspective of phenomenology with the will-driven radical freedom of thinkers such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
Question #26: 1) The claim "There is extraterrestrial life in the universe, because my father said so" is an example of an appeal to authority. But it can be viewed as an enthymeme , where the hidden assumption is that "my father is always right". In such a case, there is no logical problem with the argument. Do you agree?
2) Do you think that to say that : "Person A is biased , therefore what he says is wrong" is fallacious? It can be interpreted as "person A is biased, therefore his information cannot be trusted. Therefore what he says is wrong".
3) Are errors of logic errors of psychology as well? Or perhaps, only errors of psychology? Appeal to authority besides being a logical fallacy, has a whole psychology and sociology besides it.
Asked by: Sam, , Jun 14th, 2008
Answer:
1) We must always be careful to distinguish between arguments that are valid and those that are sound. A valid deductive argument has the proper logical structure (where true premises guarantee a true conclusion) but that is of little use if the premises themselves are false or unsure. Your expanded version of this argument is indeed valid, but the hidden premise cannot possibly be true (since human fallibility is unavoidable), so the argument is still unsound.
2) Your fallacy is the assumption that untrustworthy information is always wrong. In some ways reliably wrong information could be nearly as useful as reliably right information --it would at least enable the ruling out of some possibilities. In this case, Person A is biased therefore his information is not reliably right --but it is not reliably wrong either. Therefore, his opinion tells us nothing about the rightness of his position.
3) As we've discussed before, formal deductive logic is an artificial system designed to extend and improve upon (and theoretically to perfect) the conclusions reached by raw human intuitions (while inductive logic might perhaps be described as the mid-ground between the two). The tendency to confuse the rules of logic with the intuitions that inspired them does indeed have psychological and sociological aspects --but the same could be said for nearly all human practices.
Question #27: does the internet really exist?
Asked by: Anonymous, Jun 30th, 2008
Answer:
I apologize for answering your question in this way --and I tried to find ways to avoid it, but it can't be helped: It depends on what you mean by "exist". It seems clear that the Internet doesn't exist in the same way that a table or a person exists --at least until you try to figure out what the difference is.
The Internet is not a single, discrete physical object like a table --it is the collective name we assign both to a communications network between millions of computers, and to the information that flows over that network. Yet one might also argue that a table is merely a collective name for a diverse collection of millions of atoms arranged in a particular configuration.
The waters get even more muddied when one considers the tradition in philosophy, primarily associated with Plato, that says that everything we perceive as ordinary reality is only a pale reflection of a truer and deeper level of existence. From that point of view, it would be hard to say whether the Internet, as a largely conceptual entity, might not have a better claim to existence than the table.
Question #28: what is kants comprimise
Asked by: Anonymous, Jul 1st, 2008
Answer:
"Kant's Compromise" is a name for the fact that the philosopher Immanuel Kant is generally viewed as creating a middle ground between the warring philosophical outlooks of (Continental) Rationalism, as epitomized by French philosopher René Descartes, and (British) Empiricism, as epitomized by Scottish philosopher David Hume. The former emphasized the mind, and the use of reason and other mental faculties as the primary way of relating to the world. The latter focused instead on sensory experience and direct evidence. Kant's Compromise, stated roughly, is that both (sensory evidence and reason/judgment) are necessary.
Question #29: How can primary and secondary reflection, allow us to experience the world profoundly, and proffer a genuine sense of freedom?
Asked by: Lucy, CA, , Jul 3rd, 2008
Answer:
"Primary" and "Secondary Reflection" are concepts from the work of Christian Existentialist Gabriel Marcel. To provide a rough and inaccurate summary, primary reflection is the initial attempt to mentally apprehend an external reality as something foreign and separate, whereas secondary reflection is considers the subject as part of the larger whole within which the observer and the observed are neither separate nor separable.
From an existential point of view, when we view the world as made up of external objects distanced from ourselves, we lose awareness of our ability to influence the reality seemingly composed by such objects. It is only when we understand the extent to which personal identity extends outwards into the world that we embrace our freedom to shape the reality in which we live.
To my regret and shame, I must admit that I am no scholar of Marcel's work --an unforgivable omission for a Christian Existentialist such as myself --so much of what I have said may be untrue to his original vision. If this is a topic that interests you, I recommend you consult his works, of which The Mystery of Being is one of the most famous.
Question #30: What makes a question Philosophical in nature?
Asked by: , Jul 9th, 2008
Answer:
The word “Philosophy” literally means love of wisdom, so one answer might be questions asked strictly out of the love of wisdom or knowledge --questions whose primary purpose is not one of practical utility. I don't favor this definition, however, because I believe philosophical questions have a lot of utility, although not always in an obvious manner.
Another definition is hinted at by Socrates, in Plato's Phaedo, when he says that he studied science in his youth but found it inadequate because it only answered "how" questions and not "why" questions. Taking this as our guide, we might say that philosophical questions are those more concerned with "why" than with "how".
Question #31: Do you think that the following argument is a good one :
X says that a certain metaphysical view is correct. X says that if this view M is correct, it should produce certain effects in the psychology of people that realize it. (Make them super-smart, or super-kind for example). It is observed that X has this type of psychology. Thus the metaphysical view M is true.
Asked by: Sam, , Jul 25th, 2008
Answer:
I am part of a minority of philosophers who believe that some variant on the argument you proposed can be incorporated into a strong inductive argument --in fact I'm currently at work on just such a project, named “Pragmatic Metaphysics”. However, the argument as so stated is an example of the formal fallacy “affirming the consequent”.
P1. If Metaphysical Claim then I am Super Kind
P2. I am Super Kind
C. Therefore Metaphysical Claim
One problem is that you haven't explained why we believe P1 is true, But this argument fails even if P1 is true because we have never established “If Super Kind then Metaphysical Claim”, and the relationship is not reversible.
The danger with affirming the consequent is this: If you start with a true and known statement “B”, such as “2 + 2 = 4”, then every conditional of the form “If A then B” will automatically be true, regardless of the nature of “A”. Thus, “If it is sunny tomorrow, then 2 + 2 will equal 4.” “If it is not sunny tomorrow, then 2 + 2 will equal 4.” “If the Yankees win the World Series then 2 + 2 will equal 4.” “If the devil beats his wife, then 2 + 2 will equal 4.”
Because of this, the type of argument you outlined can never be formally sound. However, it is possible to make a similar strong inductive argument, given the following conditions:
- “A” (i.e. Metaphysical Claim) must be a reasonable explanation for many observable things, not just "B" (Super Kind). So “If A then B, C, D, E, & F”, where B through F are all true.
- “A” must not have further implications that are false. So it must not be the case that "If A then G" where G is false.
- “A” must have predictive value. So “If A then H tomorrow,” where the prediction comes before H is observed, but where H confirms the prediction.
- “A” must not have stronger rivals. There must not be an A´ or an A´´ that explains the same data in a simpler and better fashion.
Even given all this, we do not prove “A,” we can only say that there is reason to believe A, or that A offers good explanatory value. For instance, if we say it is a natural law all planets move in ellipses, there is as sense in which this is a metaphysical claim (since we can observe the planets but not the law in itself). We accept it as true because it has many true implications, no important false implications, excellent predictive value, and no stronger rivals.
Question #32: democracy implies that, the majority rules, what if the majorities are wrong, the minorities being right
Asked by: , Aug 4th, 2008
Answer:
There's not much to say here other than “you're absolutely right!” What you've identified is the chief problem with majority-rule democracy. One person can be right while ninety-nine are wrong. Whatever the popular mythos may claim, there is nothing magical about voting that ensures the right decision will be made.
It's important to remember that voting the way we do it --assuming that you are an American, or from a country with a similar system --is nothing more than a compromise solution designed to give individual citizens a say in the way their government is run, while still giving some protection to the nation as a whole from the idle whims and sudden enthusiasms of the mob.
There are other solutions as well, each with its own weaknesses:
In a pure or direct democracy, the citizens make the laws themselves, with no elected officials between them and the process. This system has almost always ended in disaster, both because there is chaos and disorder inherent in trying to determine what are the laws and how they should be enforced, as well as because of the observation Plato made in The Republic, that those who love freedom the most are the most vulnerable to the charms of a charismatic tyrant. That's the reason our system is a representative democracy rather than a pure or direct democracy. In theory, the elected officials stand between us and our worst mob impulses.
In a consensus democracy, officials are elected or laws enacted only when all people agree --thus eliminating the tyranny of the majority. However, it becomes impossibly difficult to reach consensus in groups of more than about 6 or 7 people, so this is unworkable for large-scale democracy.
In a winner takes all vote, such as the American presidential election, the majority makes the choice. However, even so, we have a system that requires (much) more than a majority for decisions that the Founding Fathers didn't want taken lightly --such as amending the constitution.
In a proportional vote, such as the British Parliament or the American Democratic primaries, the minority is still represented in any given situation, by being given a percentage of representatives proportional to the size of the minority.
My own favorite system was proposed by a character in Robert Heinlein's The Moon is a Harsh Mistress -- I don't know if it is original to him or not. In it, every ten people have the option to select a representative to represent them. Ten representatives can select a super representative, and so forth, up to the top of the system. However, nothing is done by vote. Each person is made a representative by the consensus of those he represents, and they may change their minds at any time. If a representative loses one of her constituents, she will need to find another immediately or lose her position. Thus, each representative fully represents all his constituents, not just the majority.
I don't know that it's ever been tried in real life, but it has its charms as an idea.
Question #33: Would you agree with those such as Alister McGrath that Christianity is rationally defensible, or would you say that the rational aspect is unimportant? If the latter, how would you respond to charges of thoughtless fanaticism in your religiosity?
Asked by: Alex, Aug 12th, 2008
Answer:
This is a fantastic question.
I begin my answer by noting that rationality is overvalued and its capacity overestimated. The ability of the human mind to apprehend what it considers is vast, but not unlimited. Not everything, therefore, can be understood in ways that make apparent sense and align with all the other things that we know. In particular, God would not be God if He could be fully comprehended. For this reason, I side with those who call faith unreasonable.
As a student of Kierkegaard, however, I also note that the central paradox of Christianity, of God present with us, is no more of a paradox than the paradox of existence itself. Why should there be something rather than nothing? Why does our existence mainifest in the shape that it has, rather than in some other form? Why does each of us individually and idiosyncratically exist, and why are we bound by space and time? These are questions that have no rational answers, yet we live with the paradoxes they imply because we lack the ability to do otherwise.
This leads me to what I take to be the key Kierkegaardian insight: The mystery of Christ is not only on a par with the mystery of existence, it is in fact the same mystery. The mystery of why God would enter the universe and suffer and die is the very same mystery as why that universe would exist at all, and why there would be suffering and death within it in the first place.
All this having been said, however, I think there's a danger in dismissing faith as merely or dogmatically irrational. The believer, I would claim, is not simply a believer in defiance of all evidence --which would indeed make him the thoughtless fanatic of your query.
Speaking as a believer, I would say that God has demonstrated His existence to me with evidence that is plentiful and personally compelling --yet not of a sort that lends itself to conclusive depersonalized proofs.
My aim in making such a claim is not to present a case for God's existence capable of convincing the non-believer, but to advance the argument that the intrinsic irrationality (or what we might call the "transrationality") of faith does not necessarily imply that the person who embraces faith must do so in an irrational manner. One may safely assume that the person who believes does so for valid reasons, even if those reasons are not easily understood by the non-believer.
This, it seems to me, is the best way to approach the ontological proofs of theological rationalists like Aquinas and Descartes, the apologetics of someone like C.S.Lewis, or the calculated wagers of Pascal and his ilk --not as attempts to equate faith with reason, but rather as ways of demonstrating that faith and reason are at least compatible with one another; and therefore that the embrace of one does not necessitate the destruction of the other.
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Comments from Readers:
To # 17 "What do you know that you do not know" in both senses of your discussion: Myself.7/8/08